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ABSTRACT
Glimpses of World War II in Denmark: Memory and History in
Frayn’s Copenhagen and Sibbern’s
Resistance Scrapbook
Adriana Pinegar
Department of Comparative Arts and Letters, BYU
Master of Arts
The relationship between history and memory is long and complex. While some theorists
argue that they are at odds with one another, this thesis explores the necessary relationship
between the two. Using Michael Frayn’s 1998 play, Copenhagen, and the scrapbook of a Danish
police officer and resistance fighter during World War II, the author posits the central role of
uncertainty in the negotiation of individual memory and history. The position of the observer or
witness to history affects the way the past is remembered and recorded. Individual witnesses,
even and perhaps especially where they stray from the accepted historical narrative, testify to
something that would otherwise be lost: the nature of the event. The observer therefore plays an
important role in interpreting the testimony according to its place in the flow of time.
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Introduction
On April 9, 1940, German Nazis invaded their northern neighbor, Denmark. The attack
was precisely what Danish officials had been working to avoid. Up to this point, Danish officials
had been careful not to incite the aggression of the growing Nazi power; as a small country with
a small military, they knew that an attack from a powerful army would be nearly impossible to
defend. The Danish government therefore cooperated when, after the initial attack, German
forces offered to treat Denmark as a sovereign state as long as they presented no resistance to
occupation. Nils Arne Sørensen, a history professor at the University of Southern Denmark,
explains that this agreement “meant that, technically speaking, Denmark was not at war with
Germany and the Danish government could go on functioning. As a consequence, the Danish
experience of occupation differed dramatically from those of other occupied countries in western
Europe” (Sørensen 296). This policy helped to keep the death toll of Danes relatively low (less
than 4,000 recorded deaths, roughly 0.08 percent of the total population in 1939). 1
However, as the end of the war approached and Allied forces toppled the enemy, this
cooperative relationship with the Nazis would no longer serve as a benefit. In 1943 Danish
officials angered the Nazis by punishing arsonists who attempted to burn down the Great
Synagogue in Copenhagen. When the Danish government refused to comply with an ultimatum
from the Germans, they were forced to give up sovereignty and the Germans issued a deportation
order that would send all Danish Jews to concentration camps. The underground Danish
resistance movement enlisted the help of regular citizens to organize a mass rescue effort in
In comparison, the death toll in the Netherlands was over 300,000 people, or roughly 3.45
percent of the population. These figures are according to the National World War II Museum in
New Orleans, Louisiana.
1

1

which 7,220 of Denmark’s 7,800 Jews were smuggled across the Øresund strait to asylum in
Sweden. This effort resulted in the survival of ninety nine percent of the country’s Jewish
population. It also put Denmark on the winning side at the end of the war. As a result, various
explanations began to make their way into the official history to account for Denmark’s earlier
cooperation with the Nazis. This cooperation was quickly framed as a different kind of
resistance, which protected Danish citizens (including Jews) by keeping the enemy at bay. Uffe
Østergård suggests that the presentation of the Danish government acting as a “shield” and the
resistance movement acting as a “sword” allowed Denmark to assume an honorable place in the
history of the war. He writes:
The predominant narrative about Danish politics during the occupation, “the war
of the entire people” against Germany and Nazism during the Second World War,
was established very rapidly even before the war ended…This effort saved the
Danish position at the last minute, placing Denmark on the side of the victorious
Allies as co-founder of the United Nations in the summer of 1945. How this move
was possible for a country which in real terms had been allied with Nazi Germany
until the summer of 1943 at least, almost beats imagination. Much of the success
of the maneuver depended on the fact that the majority of the Jews in Denmark,
by good luck, were saved from Nazi persecution in October 1943. (35)
By stressing the survival of the Jews and Denmark’s relative peace throughout the war, Denmark
found itself listed among the Allied countries in the history books around the world, this despite
their cooperation with Germany in the early years of the war.
In contemporary Denmark, however, the history of the occupation and Denmark’s role in
World War II has been adapted, appropriated, revised, nuanced and ultimately debated since the
2

war ended. Similar to Østergård, Nils Sørensen explains that the version of history that depicts
the cooperation of the government as “indirect or legal” resistance developed before the end of
the war (299). He documents, however, the development of competing narratives of the war,
including a version submitted by the resistance fighters that does not view the government
cooperation as subtle resistance. Sørensen writes, “After the liberation in 1945, two conflicting
narratives of the war experience were formulated. A consensus narrative presented the Danish
nation as being united in resistance while a competing narrative, which also stressed the
resistance of most Danes, depicted the collaborating Danish establishment as an enemy alongside
the Germans” (295). In the years since the end of the war, the “official” narrative in Denmark
has been disputed, often by politicians and historians, as well as by survivors and their
descendants.
These debates started before World War II was over and they continue into the present.
The fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war spurred historian Henning Poulsen’s rather blunt
and bleak summary of Denmark’s involvement: “We collaborated politically with the occupation
power and achieved conditions that, in comparison with other occupied countries were good and
relatively free. We then got a resistance movement at half price, and, finally, we became an
allied power without entering the war” (qtd. in Sørensen 295). Such interpretations of the war
have been disputed in order to establish positions on foreign policy. In a speech given in 2003,
then Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen painted a picture of Danish World War II activity
in order to “justify Danish participation in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq” (Sørensen 46). And
there are other practical reasons for the ongoing debate. In April of 2013, the Danish Resistance
Museum (Frihedsmuseet) in Copenhagen was destroyed by a fire. The museum began as a
temporary exhibition in the Masonic Lodge in Copenhagen in the summer of 1945 and favored
3

the narrative that portrayed the Danish resistance movement working against not only the
Germans but also the Danish government. In a press release about the damage caused by the fire
and planned rebuilding of the museum, a description of the earliest museum reads:
Det allerførste, midlertidige « Frihedsmuseum » i Frimurerlogen var en
sejrsudstilling med et klart og populært budskab: Vi var også med i kampen mod
nazismen, så vi har også vores andel i sejren. « Vi » omfattede i den sammenhæng
strengt taget kun modstandsbevægelsen. Men det store flertal af befolkningen,
som for langt de flestes vedkommende havde været pro-britisk og antinazistisk
indstillet gennem hele besættelsen, kunne også føle sig inkluderet. Udelukket var
kun det mindretal, som havde været på den « forkerte » side og—diskret
antydet—politikerne som repræsentanter for det Danmark, som ikke havde
kæmpet. (National Museum of Denmark)
The very first temporary “Freedom Museum” in the Masonic Lodge was a victory exhibition
with a clear and popular message: We were also in the fight against Nazism, so we also share
in the victory. “We” included in the context strictly speaking only the resistance movement.
But the vast majority of the population, which for the most part had been pro-British and
anti-Nazi throughout the occupation, could also feel included. Excluded were only the
minority who had been on the “wrong” side and—discreetly hinted at—politicians as
representatives of Denmark, who had not fought. 2
As the museum developed, it managed to maintain this narrative. However, the directors of the
National Museum (of which the Resistance Museum is a part) viewed the fire as an opportunity

2

All translations from the Danish press release are mine.
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to expand the scope of the museum in order to provide context that would account for all the
“complexity and contradictions” of the time. In the press release, they suggest:
Vi skal fortsat fremlægge historien med de forskelle i vægtningen…og vi skal
som hidtil lade det være op til publikum selv at tænke og drage egne
konklusioner. Det er godt, hvis en udstilling som Frihedsmuseets rejser spørgsmål
hos den besøgende. Det er betænkeligt, hvis den også forsøger at levere entydige
svar, for virkeligheden er sjældent entydig; det var den heller ikke for dem, som i
sin tid valgte at tilslutte sig modstanden. Det er ved at forstå, at valget hverken var
let eller enkelt, men nødvendigt for den enkelte, at vi andre kan lære noget ved at
gå på Frihedsmuseet. (National Museum of Denmark)
We must continue to make history with the differences in the balance…and we
must continue to leave it up to the audience to think and draw their own
conclusions. It is good if an exhibition like the Resistance Museum raises
questions for the visitors. It is questionable if it also tries to provide unequivocal
answers, reality is rarely unequivocal; it was not for those who, in their time,
chose to join the resistance. It is by understanding that the choice was neither easy
nor simple, but necessary for the individual, that we can learn something by going
to the Resistance Museum.
The National Museum is attempting to keep the story of the resistance relevant to modern
audiences by presenting multiple narratives and asking them to engage in an interpretive process
in order to understand the nature of the events being recalled. Opposition to this proposed
revision of the museum argues that the museum began as a museum honoring the freedom
fighters, and that it should be rebuilt in that spirit. Those who oppose the newly proposed
5

changes feel that by expanding the scope and recognizing other possible versions of the history,
the bravery of the resistance fighters is discredited.

6

Two Accounts of World War II
The example of the Danish Resistance Museum highlights why accounts of World War II
provide an interesting example by which to examine issues of memory and history. As the event
recedes further into the past, the number of living people who have personal memories of the war
is dwindling. Archiving efforts and anniversary commemorations attempt to preserve and honor
those memories before they are lost forever. The “facts” of World War II have long since been
recorded, but the testimony of eyewitnesses offers something outside of those facts, which bears
witness to the nature of the event itself. What is said and how it is communicated is at the heart
of a different kind of understanding that reveals how memory has shaped and been shaped
through time. Every person, organization and nation remembers the war differently. All of these
disparate accounts should not frustrate but rather contribute to a better understanding of the
Second World War. They bear witness to the traumatic nature of the event in a way that no
collection of data, however harrowing, could ever accomplish.
The remainder of this thesis will analyze two very different accounts. These accounts
reveal the nature of the event as they testify to the “breakage of a framework” of history (Felman
and Laub 60). Their treatment of history sometimes departs from a historical narrative,
witnessing to the aftershocks of war that have shaken and shaped the present. Both texts deal
with the geographically and chronologically particular topic of the Danish experience of World
War II, though a discussion of both texts will prove their refusal to remain isolated according to
location and time. By analyzing these two texts together, I hope to illustrate the important role of
uncertainty in understanding the past. Uncertainty does not discount the possibility of knowing,
but underscores the position of the audience in interpreting what we know. The first text I will
discuss is Michael Frayn’s 1998 play, Copenhagen, which recounts an elusive yet crucial
7

incident between Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg during the early years of World War II. The
second text is a multi-volume scrapbook made by a former Danish police officer who worked as
a double agent for the resistance movement during the Nazi occupation.
Copenhagen takes as its subject the clandestine meeting of Niels Bohr and Werner
Heisenberg, both Nobel prize-winning physicists. The two enjoyed a friendship and collaborative
working relationship for nearly twenty years. In the early twenties, Heisenberg, the younger of
the two scientists, moved from his native Germany to Denmark in order to work with Bohr.
During that period, the duo made several important advancements in the world of quantum
physics, though none so revolutionary as the Copenhagen Interpretation, which combines
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle with Bohr’s theory of complementarity. Despite their joint
success, Heisenberg moved back to Germany in 1928 to accept a position at the University of
Leipzig. Shortly thereafter, Hitler gained power in Germany and eventually the Nazis invaded
several European countries, including Denmark. In the early years of World War II, Heisenberg
returned to Copenhagen to visit his old mentor. There is no record of their conversation during
this meeting, but it is understood that Bohr quickly became upset and sent Heisenberg away.
Subsequent attempts by both of the scientists to recall their conversation reveal conflicting
accounts. After this meeting, Heisenberg returned to Germany and worked with the Axis powers
to build a nuclear bomb. They were unsuccessful. But the Allied forces, with help from Bohr, not
only built but dropped atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan in 1945. Throughout the
rest of their lives, both scientists tried to make sense of their meeting in 1941, with little success.
In Copenhagen, Frayn deals with this historic episode in a unique manner. The characters
circle around the event of their “famed meeting” in an effort to understand just what was said
and what the consequences of that meeting in fact were. Despite repeated efforts to recover this
8

memory, they never arrive at a conclusion about what took place or how to understand its
significance. Michael Frayn is English and has no evident ties to Denmark, except in his interest
in Bohr and Heisenberg’s relationship. The action of the play also seems to be only tangentially
related to the war in Denmark. However, this is precisely what is at work in Frayn’s drama.
While the play seems to be only concerned with the understanding of personal memory, the way
each of the scientists remembers the events changes how they view history as a continuum.
Furthermore, the questions in Frayn’s play problematize how each of the two scientists have
been understood by history, not only as scientists but as citizens of their respective nations. The
playwright arrives at no solid conclusions, but he does propose a means whereby each individual
takes ownership of their view of the past, which is not a nihilistic or relativist approach to
history, but a demand for the responsible creation of a necessarily new interpretation of the past
based on the position of the observer.
The resistance scrapbook suggests a similar reading. The text was compiled in the 1960s
in Los Angeles, California by a Danish man named Viggo Bjørn Sibbern. A rather unique text,
the scrapbook is a set of five volumes that span the years of World War II. The thematic thrust of
the text is on the war in Denmark and the Danish resistance movement, in particular. The
contents of the scrapbook are items that Sibbern collected and preserved throughout the course of
the war and in the several years between the end of the war and the construction of the
scrapbook. He includes fliers, posters, drawings, booklets, photographs and tickets, in addition to
three-dimensional objects like badges and armbands. Among these artifacts, Sibbern provides
explanations about their meaning and significance, but his words and the objects can never
convey all the meaning these vehicles of memory hold for him.
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Despite the historical subject of the scrapbook and the archival quality of its contents, the
scrapbook represents Sibbern’s personal experience. While he makes every effort to remain
unbiased, he can only speak from his own perspective and from the present. The fragmented
temporality inherent in the scrapbook results in a traumatic text that bears witness to the Danish
resistance movement, testifying as much through the silences and gaps in the narrative as
through the words and images Sibbern has compiled. As in Frayn’s play, subjectivity is
underscored, not as a weakness but as a creative opportunity for memory to fill in the gaps
inherent in history. What is witnessed to is the nature of the event and how it has been
remembered, not the event itself.
The two texts are linked more by their differences than their similarities. The hyperfictional treatment of history in Frayn’s play stands in contrast to the tangible historical artifacts
collected in Sibbern’s scrapbook. Frayn and Sibbern are separated by myriad differences: time,
profession, experience and language. Frayn composed Copenhagen more than fifty years after
World War II ended. Born in England in 1933, he was a young child during the war and the
subject of his work is not a matter of personal past. Writing late in the twentieth century in
England colored his perception of his subject, which he researched through letters, journals and
published works. In addition to all of this, Frayn was a celebrated playwright when he debuted
Copenhagen. His work demonstrates a control and an awareness, which he utilizes in order to
expose the inability to ever know everything. His effort to deliver this message to his audience is
very deliberate. Sibbern’s scrapbook exposes the same uncertainty that Frayn carefully crafts in
Copenhagen, but Sibbern arrives at it almost on accident. Like Frayn, he is writing from a
temporal and geographical distance, but his subject is his own experience, using a collection of
documents to illustrate his narrative. Whereas Frayn’s presentation of history is hyper10

fictionalized, Sibbern’s scrapbook appears as a historical archive. Despite all these differences,
both texts point to the gaps in representation and the inability to fully capture or relate history.
Sibbern’s layered text with its self-conscious recognition of subjectivity, demands to be
read as a postmodern history, which “contest[s] the very possibility of our ever being able to
know the ‘ultimate objects’ of the past” (Hutcheon 24). This is not a denial of the ability or the
opportunity to learn from the past, but a “recognition of the fact that the social, historical, and
existential ‘reality’ of the past is discursive reality when it is used as the referent of art, and so
the only ‘genuine historicity’ becomes that which would openly acknowledge its own discursive,
contingent identity” (24). The very aesthetic of the scrapbook supports this type of reading,
because “[it] involves the transfer of materials from one context to another so that the objects are
given a double reading: the fragment as perceived in relation to its context of origin on the one
hand, and as incorporated into a new whole on the other” (Katriel and Farrell 10-1). The items in
the scrapbook are to be encountered individually and collectively, not because “there is some
special dispensation whereby the signs that constitute an historical text have reference to events
in the world” (Kermode 108), but because as a collection they bear witness to what is not
included in the archive: the trace. The trace reveals through brief glimpses what cannot be known
in entirety.
Copenhagen is all about the trace as well. The play circles around an event, but never
arrives, because the event is only encountered through its absence. Frayn is careful not to place
blame on anyone for this loss. In fact, Frayn’s trace indicates that what is lost is something that is
not apparent until (or perhaps because) it is gone. As Bohr tells Margrethe at the very beginning
of the play: “Some questions have no answers to find” (Frayn 3). These are the questions Frayn
builds his drama around. Just like the white spaces in the scrapbook, it is in the gaps of memory
11

that the audience is invited to engage with the text. In those gaps, the audience “comes to look
for something that is in fact nonexistent; a record that has yet to be made” (Felman and Laub 57).
This lack creates an obligation of those in the present to fill in the gaps by creating a new
memory, through the event of witnessing. Frayn teaches his audiences how to responsibly
engage with the text so that the creative act is not a relativist commandeering of the past for
personal purposes. He demands that the audience bear witness to the nature of an event that
cannot be relayed fully. This witnessing requires a special engagement and listening to the text
that does not allow the reader to advance his or her own personal agenda in the interpretation of
the past. Witnessing becomes a new and creative act, belated, but only possible as such.
Rather than provide an account of history, these texts represent the act of witnessing. Just
as the proposed modifications to the Resistance Museum would provide a venue for new
memories of the resistance movement to be created, Sibbern’s scrapbook becomes an event in
itself: the event of witnessing. Furthermore, Frayn’s characters are not shown reenacting the past,
but remembering it. The reflective tone of the museum and the selected texts demonstrates what
is really at stake. The way things are remembered and how an event takes shape throughout time
lies at the heart of these works. How a person chooses to remember determines what is
remembered, and the moment of remembering becomes “a historical event in its own right”
(Felman and Laub 85). Frayn’s play and Sibbern’s scrapbook do not attempt to dismiss or
replace historical truth. Instead, they reveal the ethical and moral implications of remembering,
and propose a quantum ethics, which allows for multiple possibilities by revealing the agency of
the witness in the act of remembering.

12

Memory and History
At the heart of each of these examples is the negotiation of memory and history. The
rebuilding of the museum and the debates that surround it about what and how to remember
provide a fascinating example of complexities at the heart of the relationship between memory
and history. In the press release announcing the new vision for the Resistance Museum, among
the primary reasons for the proposed changes was the need to adapt to the way visitors receive
information and engage with history. The announcement observes that, “Man er ikke blot passiv
modtager af en fortælling, men selv med til at præge dens retning” (People are not merely
passive recipients of a narrative, rather they help shape its direction; National Museum of
Denmark). With the new scope and design of the museum, the directors are anticipating an
audience that may not have any knowledge of the resistance and they are attempting to provide a
forum for understanding. The museum directors suggest that the one thing the original founders
would have wanted is for the museum to remain “relevant” to the public. They express the
concern that “jo længere begivenhederne rykker på afstand, jo mere bliver man nødt til at
forklare” (the further into the past an event moves, the more we have to explain; National
Museum of Denmark). The museum once relied on the collective memory of those who
experienced the war and participated in the resistance, but as time moves on, visitors to the
museum require context and backstory in order to understand the exhibitions and ultimately to
pass judgment on the past. Collective memory gives way to a seemingly more objective sense of
history. In another paragraph of the museum press release, the directors express a desire to create
an exhibition where “den besøgende kan forstå den tid, begivenhederne udspillede sig i. En tid,
hvor eksempelvis respekten for autoriteter var langt større, end vi er vant til i dag” (the visitor
can understand the time that the events took place. A time when, for example, respect for
13

authority was far greater than we are accustomed to today; National Museum of Denmark).
Visitors to the museum are being asked to witness to the events of the resistance. In redesigning
the museum, the museum directors are attempting to provide the context and perspective
necessary to convey not simply historical fact, but the nature of those events being witnessed to.
The proposed updates to the Danish Resistance Museum are just another example of
modern museums’ constant effort to negotiate between objective and factual documents and
artifacts (classified as history) and the more tenuous, flexible and conflicted ideas referred to as
memory. Memory and history are constantly in flux. Similarly, the terms themselves are far from
stable. For the purposes of this thesis, the distinctions between the two are outlined below. My
understanding of memory is based on the concept of active memory as articulated by Marie
Louise Seeberg, Irene Levin and Claudia Lenz in The Holocaust as Active Memory. According to
this model, memory takes place in the present and implies an individual experience. Seeberg,
Levin and Lenz describe memory “not only as a conscious or subconscious element in the minds
of people as they go about their lives, but as intrinsic to dynamic processes that make a
difference to the social contexts in which people take part: as continuously relevant information”
(4). Memory remains relevant in the sense that it informs the present, while circumstances in the
present weigh heavily on the way memories are represented. Human memory (both individual
and collective) is not like computer memory that stores an original file, which can be accessed at
anytime. There is no raw file to be retrieved or recovered. Instead, memory is constantly being
reformed according to the moment of remembrance. Seeberg, Levin and Lenz write:
Our experiences belong to the past, but they are continually reconstructed in the
present. In the present, both the past and the future are represented so that the past
becomes a reconstruction. We use the concept of memory as a linkage between
14

the past as it happened and the present time when the story is told, with
perspectives of the future embedded within it…The past is nothing in itself. It
changes as our experiences change…we see our new experiences in light of
earlier ones. In this sense, too, we can never go back to any previous point in time
and the past may only be viewed from the position of the present. (5)
Memory, then, is steeped in the present and its demands. As opposed to history, which places a
distance between the past and the present, memory joins the two together while also taking into
account the future as it is anticipated in the present. With these different temporalities being
negotiated in one instant, it becomes easier to understand why memory is ever changing.
While memory is grounded in the present and therefore changes over time, history is also
always under construction, though for different reasons and in different ways. Whereas the
fluidity of memory is an organic natural occurrence, history is always being reworked in search
of an elusive objectivity. Paul Ricoeur suggests that history is so often rewritten because:
Nous attendons de l’histoire une certaine objectivité, l’objectivité qui lui convient;
la façon dont l’histoire naît et renaît nous l’atteste; elle procède toujours de la
rectification de l’arrangement official et pragmatique de leur passé par les
societies traditionnelles. Cette rectification n’est pas d’un autre esprit que la
rectification que représente la science physique par rapport au premier
arrangement des apparences dans la perception et dans les cosmologies qui lui
resent tributaires. (Ricoeur 24-5)
We expect from history a certain objectivity, the objectivity that is suite to it; the
way in which history is born and reborn attests to it; it always proceeds from
traditional societies’ rectification of the official, pragmatic arrangement of their
15

past. This rectification is not different in spirit from that of physical science in
relation to the first arrangement of appearances in perception and in the
cosmologies that remain dependent on it. (Le Goff 115)
From Ricoeur’s explanation, history takes on a scientific air: as new information and new
knowledge is discovered, the historical record is corrected to reflect these findings. This revision
process often replaces rather than builds off of previous versions of the event, so that in the quest
for objectivity, the nature of the event is lost and history becomes an abstraction of what once
lived in personal and collective memory.
This abstraction of the past that results from constant editing becomes disorienting,
according to French historian Pierre Nora. He suggests that “When we try to puzzle out our
relation to the past by studying significant historical works, we discover that our historical
knowledge is not at all like memory: instead of placing us in a continuous relation with the past,
it creates a sense of discontinuity” (11). Indeed, adjusting a historical record to contain all that is
understood in the present tends to erase rather than to explain a connection to the past. However,
this scientific insistence on being current is in part due to the aim of history—as well as its “most
flagrant contradiction” (Le Goff 115)—which demands that “its object is singular (an event or
series of events, or figures who appear only once), [while] its goal, like that of all sciences, is the
universal, general, and regular” (115). In this thesis, the important distinction between history
and memory is that history attempts to understand the past generally and universally, while
memory places the individual at the heart of a negotiation between past and present.
Some of the tension that arises between memory and history is due to the different ways
that each navigates the relationship between the past and the present. As new discoveries are
made, history is rewritten to reflect the knowledge of the present. Time presses forward, bringing
16

with it a supposedly superior understanding of the past, and it is up to those in the present to
correct the misunderstandings of those who came before. History places a distance between the
audience (the student, the historian, the civilian) and the event. It takes as a given the notion that
with the passage of time comes greater understanding, and therefore, a greater ability to judge;
those in the present can more objectively interpret the past precisely because they did not live it.
A simple explanation would perhaps suggest that history is based on facts, but French historian
Jacques Le Goff insists that “historical objectivity cannot be reduced to pure subservience to
facts” (113). Interpretation is always required in light of established facts. Léopold Génicot,
himself a historian, makes an important distinction about the role of the historian in this
interpretive process. He writes:
The historian does not have the right to pursue a demonstration despite contrary
evidence, to defend a cause no matter what it is. He must establish and show the
truth or what he believes to be the truth. But it is impossible for him to be
objective, to abstract from his ideas about man, and notably when it is a question
of gauging the importance of events and their causal relations. (qtd. in Le Goff
111-2)
Génicot makes it clear that while the historian has an obligation to known facts, there is no
chance of objectivity. One may believe that he or she has achieved a satisfactory distance from
the past that allows for objectivity and perfect understanding, but “ein Chaos von
Existenzialurteilen über unzählige einzelne Wahrnehmungen wäre das einzige, was der Versuch
eines ernstlich voraussetzungslosen erkennens der Wirklichkeit erzielen würde” (“any attempt to
understand (historical) reality without subjective hypotheses will end in nothing but a jumble of
existential judgments on countless isolated events”; Weber 177; Le Goff 113-4). In other words,
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objectivity is unattainable and the presumption to be objective will only lead to misinterpretation.
Objectivity is so elusive because the historian can never fully remove himself from time.
This temporal distance can never be achieved because any knowledge in the present is
contingent on all that preceded it. Le Goff explains that “there are…at least two histories: that of
collective memory and that of historians. The first appears as essentially mythic, deformed, and
anachronistic. But it constitutes the lived reality of the never-completed relation between present
and past” (111). While a history that relies on memory is messy and incomplete, it is also able to
account for the paradoxically simultaneous distance and proximity between the past and the
present. The two are distinctly separate, and yet one is always imperceptibly blending into the
other. Nora articulates this ceaseless blur of time as “the eternal present” (3). Nora has
contributed significantly to the discussion of memory and history. His influential work, Lieux de
Mémoire is an exploration of the relationship between the two phenomena and their changing
nature. Nora sees memory as starkly contrasted to history, which he condemns as stagnant and
cold. He explains:
Memory and history, far from being synonymous, are thus in many respects
opposed. Memory is life, always embodied in living societies and as such in
permanent evolution, subject to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting,
unconscious of the distortions to which it is subject, vulnerable in various ways to
appropriation and manipulation, and capable of lying dormant for long periods
only to be suddenly reawakened. History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction,
always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer. Memory is always a
phenomenon of the present, a bond tying us to the eternal present; history is a
representation of the past. (3)
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For Nora, it is memory that embraces the past in the present. In his construct, memory is an
active and dynamic process: flexible, malleable, adaptive. History, as Nora paints it, is the
opposite: a stagnant representation of the past that attempts to look back without any
engagement. Nora laments that history is accelerating in such a way that it has begun to eclipse
what he calls “true” memory, which he describes as “all-powerful, sweeping, un-self-conscious,
and inherently present-minded—a memory without a past that eternally recycles a heritage,
relegating ancestral yesterdays to the undifferentiated time of heroes, inceptions, and myth” (2).
For Nora, this “true” memory becomes a means by which the events of the past transcend time in
order to find significance and meaning in the present. This meaning is threatened by history,
which attempts to reconstruct the past and in doing so divorces the remnants of “true” memory
from their context in both the past and the present.
Nora’s presentation of memory and history is not without critics. While most scholars
acknowledge the important contributions of Nora’s study, there is a fair amount of resistance to
the binary he sets up in his configuration of memory and history. Michael Rothberg finds lieux
de memoire—these sites of memory that Nora argues have replaced organic, spontaneous, “true”
memory—too static. He suggests instead “noeuds de memoire” or “knots of memory” as a way
to illustrate the complexity and dynamic nature of memory in relation to history. He writes,
“Noeuds de memoire…are not static conglomerations of heterogeneous elements…Sites of
memory do not remember by themselves, they require the active agency of individuals and
publics. Such agency entails recognizing and revealing the production of memory as an ongoing
process involving inscription and reinscription, coding and recoding” (8-9). Rothberg views the
interpretation of memory and the ties to the past and present as too complex to be understood in
Nora’s model.
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Rothberg is not alone in his sense of memory as an ongoing process with historical
weight. Australian historian Paula Hamilton argues for “an integral relationship, an essential
interdependence between memory and history, despite claims of great tension and
conflict…Memory is gradually lost and here the historian steps in to tell the stories that people
forget—the ‘gaps’ in the collective remembering. Just as the people do remember what the
historians forget” (12). In these nuanced views of Nora’s discussion, the collaborative,
cooperative relationship of history and memory is underscored. Each fills a role that the other
cannot, enriching understanding on both sides.
Without doubt, there are differences and tension between history and memory. Of particular
concern in this thesis is the often-controversial role of individual memory in history. There is
great public interest in individual voices, 3 but when those testimonies clash with history, tension
arises. Hamilton suggests that the tension comes not only from the differences between memory
and history, but from the conflicting narratives of individuals being asked to accept as history a
memory that does not match their own. She writes:
Memories are claimed as individual but the greatest conflicts occur when people
insist that others should remember as they do…[People] argue over what
happened and what interpretation to place on the experience, which is usually
negotiated through the collective process of remembering. (15)
Above, Hamilton identifies some of the friction between memory and history. Memory is
“claimed as individual,” whereas history requires “a sanctioned narrative” (Sturken 119). History

3

Volumes have been written debating the accuracy and validity of eyewitnesses in such
traumatic events as the Holocaust, 9/11 and various wars. In popular culture, autobiographies and
memoirs by individuals with varying levels of notoriety are regularly ranked among the national
bestsellers.
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“belongs to everyone and to no one” (Nora 2), meaning that it is public and inherited, but also
that it cannot be changed at will by a single individual. As Hamilton suggests, there is a required
negotiation about how to interpret events in the past. Like with the example of the Resistance
Museum, the “sanctioned narrative” can and does change over time, but it remains out of the
control of the individual. In fact, once something moves from individual memory to part of an
official history, the individual appears to vanish from the narrative.
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A Series of Glimpses: Michael Frayn’s Copenhagen
On May 28, 1998, a new drama by the English playwright Michael Frayn premiered at
the National Theatre in London. The play was called Copenhagen, and it took as its subject a
single mysterious meeting between German physicist Werner Heisenberg and his mentor, Danish
physicist Niels Bohr. Frayn was already a well-known playwright when Copenhagen debuted.
His behind-the-scenes farce, Noises Off, had received a Tony nomination for Best Play in 1983,
and multiple reviewers called it “the funniest play written in the twentieth century” (Lathan).
Copenhagen surprised audiences that were expecting something similar to Frayn’s previous
work. With a small cast, simple set, somber tone and disjointed chronology, Copenhagen could
not be more different from Noises Off. Nevertheless, the new play was met with high critical and
popular acclaim.
Copenhagen has just three characters: the two physicists and Bohr’s wife, Margrethe,
make up the entire cast. The set is sparse, consisting of a circle of light cast onto a stage, empty
except for three chairs, one for each of the actors. As they deliver their lines, the actors either sit
or else roam around the lighted area like electrons orbiting around a nucleus. The three main
characters in the play seemingly speak from beyond the grave, 4 attempting to recount the details
of the meeting in which their personal and professional lives intersected with world history.
Traditional plot development and chronology are brushed aside as the action of the play moves
through a hyper-fictionalized realm of space and time. A basic plot summary fails to capture all
that happens in the play, for there is little action.

4

The play is set after “all three of [the characters are] dead and gone” (Frayn 3), in a nondescript
afterlife.
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The play is based on a clandestine meeting between Heisenberg and Bohr that took place
in Copenhagen in the early years of World War II. Heisenberg’s visit to his old mentor was
controversial for a number of reasons; the most glaring one being that he was traveling from
Germany to Denmark, which was occupied by the Nazis during this time. The motivation behind
the visit and the conversation shared during their brief walk in Tivoli Gardens that evening form
the inaccessible kernel at the center of Frayn’s play. History shows only what happened:
Heisenberg worked for the Nazis to develop a bomb, and the effort was unsuccessful. However,
Frayn explores possible reasons why Heisenberg was so desperate to meet with Bohr, and each
proposed reason skews the story in a different way. Heisenberg may have been seeking moral
advice from Bohr, he may have been asking for help in working out calculations that could
unlock the key to the Germans’ atomic bomb project, or he may have been spying on Bohr to
assess if the Allied sources were any closer to building a bomb. At stake in the ongoing
interpretations of the event is the outcome of World War II. As Heisenberg would have the
Bohrs believe, he helped to thwart the Nazis by waylaying Germany’s atomic bomb project,
thereby allowing the Allied forces to win the race to create a nuclear weapon. The meeting
between Bohr and Heisenberg serves as a turning point in the war, though neither of the
acclaimed physicists could have known all of the implications of their meeting at the moment it
took place. The three characters recreate the episode again and again, attempting to recover an
intention or meaning, but they find the task impossible. Uncertainty becomes the only constant in
the multiple “drafts” of the experiment.
Below I will work to explain the distinction Frayn’s play draws between uncertainty and
unknowability. A misreading of Frayn’s play may suggest a sort of nihilism in the face of such
unknowable events. However, I shall attempt to prove that the message of Copenhagen is in fact
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quite the opposite. Frayn’s presentation of uncertainty demonstrates not the inability to know
anything, but the important role of the observer in understanding what and how things are
known. Such a view moves Frayn’s play away from the idea of history as discussed previously
and into the realm of memory. I will describe the way Frayn uses the scientific discoveries of his
two main characters to illustrate the tension involved in the observation of something that never
fully concludes. This tension is a result of the position of the observer as well as the limitations
of measurement. As I argue below, an awareness of these limitations allows for meaningful and
approximate data to be collected and pave a way for a quantum ethics that helps to navigate the
terrain between memory and history.
Frayn weaves the principles of quantum physics seamlessly into the dialogue of his work,
paralleling the contributions made by the two physicists with the questions at the heart of the
play. Heisenberg, Bohr and Margrethe are attempting to give voice to intentions that cannot be
observed in the trace of recorded history. Just like the particles Heisenberg and Bohr observe, the
elusive and unrecoverable intentions of the past can only be approximated based on the trace
they leave behind as they travel through time. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle found that it is
impossible to know everything about a particle. The more precisely one variable is measured, the
less precisely its complementary variable can be determined. This principle does not imply that
nothing can be known for certain, but that some level of approximation is always in play when
observing a particle because observation and measurement are based on the position of the one
observing, just as history is shaped by the position of the historian. Bohr summarizes for the
audience, explaining:
Measurement is not an impersonal event that occurs with impartial universality.
It’s a human act, carried out from a specific point of view in time and space, from
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the one particular viewpoint of a possible observer. Then…we discover that there
is no precisely determinable objective universe. That the universe exists only as a
series of approximations. Only within the limits determined by our relationship
with it. Only through the understanding lodged inside the human head. (71-2)
Attempts to understand the behavior of a particle involve disturbing the particle by introducing
another element, such as a photon of light, and watching how the particle reacts to the interfering
element. This attempt to locate a particle and to anticipate its future behavior affects the way that
Heisenberg and Bohr go about treating the particle. Chronology and causality are undermined by
the methods used to observe the particle’s behavior. The whole endeavor becomes somewhat
cyclical because each decision determines the outcome it is attempting to measure.
In a restatement of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, Bohr explains to the audience that
“[Particles] are either one thing or the other. They can’t be both. We have to choose one way of
seeing them or the other. But as soon as we do we can’t know everything about them” (69).
While Bohr and Heisenberg are concerned with the behavior and movement of particles, the
implications of this statement extend beyond the world of quantum physics. Heisenberg’s
concise summary of his findings reveals the elusive nature of both particles and the past; and
therefore the fateful meeting between Bohr and Heisenberg. He explains that “you have no
absolutely determinate situation in the world, which among other things lays waste to the idea of
causality, the whole foundation of science—because if you don’t know how things are today you
certainly can’t know how they’re going to be tomorrow” (68). The three characters’ ability to
understand the past is limited by the way they have chosen to remember and interpret it, as well
as their position as observers. They cannot arrive at an absolute understanding because each of
their memories includes not only what happened that day, but also their intentions, suspicions
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and concerns, as well as their understanding of what resulted from the meeting. Furthermore,
they are blind to the intentions, suspicions and concerns of all others involved. What they
remember is the significance the event took on in the time after the meeting. Frayn’s characters
are a microcosm of the challenges in attempting to recount the past and an exploration of what
memory really represents: not the event but the nature of the event as it has evolved through
time.
In Copenhagen, Frayn delicately unravels Bohr’s certainty by replaying the story again
and again with new information (or old memories) each time. Bohr was a Dane with Jewish
heritage who eventually escaped occupied Denmark in a boat to Sweden by night and was
whisked away to New Mexico to work with the Allied forces trying to beat the Germans at their
own game. His natural inclination is to interpret Heisenberg’s participation in the German effort
to build an atomic bomb as collaboration with the enemy and a betrayal of a twenty year
friendship. However, when he chooses to view Heisenberg’s behavior in this way, he limits
himself from “knowing everything about [Heisenberg]” (Frayn 69). Occasionally Bohr becomes
wrapped up in reminiscences of happy times making landmark discoveries alongside his young
colleague. Other times he becomes frustrated by intelligence he gained after Heisenberg’s visit,
such as information regarding Heisenberg’s role in fumbling the calculations to build a reactor
for the Germans. With each repetition of the memory, Bohr’s perspective changes. Each iteration
causes Bohr to view not only Heisenberg’s actions, but also his own participation in the war
using a different measurement. By the end of the play, the characters and audience are no closer
to a single conclusion—instead, the possibilities continue to multiply each time they revisit the
past. It is not that the event has changed or that memory is being betrayed. Rather, as different
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outcomes are focused on, the nature of the event shifts because its meaning in the flow of time is
different.
Through the constant repetition of the past, Frayn’s three characters attempt to engage
with the traces of both external and internal information. Heisenberg, Bohr and Margrethe are the
only people that could be expected to explain exactly what happened during Heisenberg’s fateful
visit, as well as its significance. Not only because they were the only people present, but also
because they seem to have the advantage of looking at the event in hindsight, having lived
through the aftermath of the event. But Frayn carefully picks apart even this thesis, illustrating,
“How difficult it is to see even what’s in front of one’s eyes. All we possess is the present, and
the present endlessly dissolves into the past” (86). In the timeless realm that Frayn’s characters
inhabit, they are able to explore the past without the relentless advancement of time. In the world
of these characters, past, present and future blend seamlessly together and they are able to shift
events around so that they take on new or different meanings. The suspension of time allows for
a probing of the past in which “no one can be hurt…no one can be betrayed” (Frayn 4). As the
characters together recount Heisenberg’s visit in 1941, they use the past tense when they refer to
the events of their memory. But this memory is “a curious sort of diary…You step through the
pages into the months and days themselves. The past becomes the present inside your head”
(Frayn 6). As such, Margrethe, Bohr and Heisenberg often transition between the past and
present tense, as if re-inhabiting their memories. The staging of the play leaves this rather
ambiguous, because the scene does not change to indicate what time they occupy. 5

5

This is not true of the 2002 PBS Hollywood Presents: Copenhagen, a film version of the play.
Rather than a filmed stage production, the made-for-TV movie is set in modern Copenhagen and
presented as a series of flashbacks.
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This strategy effectively illustrates the way the individual experiences of each character
are tied up in a way that resists isolation. Seeberg, Levin and Lenz explain that “the world
[consists] of systems, of open systems that form each others’ environment and interact with and
mutually influence each other, so that the process taking place within any one system cannot be
understood in isolation” (Seeberg, Levin and Lenz 5). If each character’s memory is viewed as
part of a system, an attempt to isolate one of these parts would be to decontextualize memory in
such a way that whatever meaning is interpreted or derived will be limited at best. The entire
play revolves around the three characters attempting to recover something unrecorded,
something that was lost with the passage of time, or that was never there to begin with. All these
years later, it is not that the moment cannot be remembered, but that when the event occurred, it
did not hold the meaning that the present now assigns to it. They look back on the meeting in
Copenhagen as an episode in the continuum of history, but when it occurred, there was no
special or inherent meaning being inscribed. It is not until they look back and demand certain
answers from this moment that the interpretation of that memory reveals its instability. The event
has acquired new meaning for each of the characters based on all that came before and after the
meeting, so the memory of the event alone can never again be isolated.
As the play continues, each character offers information intended to explain their
decisions or exonerate them of any guilt. But as these details are piled on, they begin to
contradict or at least conflict with the narrative up to that point. In order to deflect blame or
otherwise justify their behavior, the characters draw from events that take place both before and
after Heisenberg’s visit. One moment they are reminiscing about ski trips and joint discoveries
and just a few lines later they are arguing about dropping the bomb on Hiroshima, all the while
attempting to convince each other to see things from their perspective. When they speak, it is
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sometimes unclear whether they are addressing the audience or each other. 6 There is a sense in
which all information arrives belatedly, because the characters are outside of time. Whatever the
characters are trying to convince each other of, it will not change the past.
Throughout the play, Bohr repeatedly emphasizes to Heisenberg the importance of being
able to “make the whole thing clear to Margrethe.” He elaborates on his belief that “we don’t do
science for ourselves, that we do it so we can explain it to others…In plain language. Not your
view…but for Margrethe’s sake” (38, emphasis added). Bohr places special importance on the
ability to abandon personal perspective in order to translate difficult mathematics into something
that anyone can understand (Margrethe becomes the stand-in for any conceivable audience).
Bohr reduces complex theories to a general, simplified version. This tendency to explain
everything is contrasted with Heisenberg’s refusal to do the same. Bohr complains to
Heisenberg, “You never cared what got destroyed on the way…As long as the mathematics
worked out you were satisfied” (25). The two scientists’ professional habits translate into the
way they approach a reworking of the past. While Heisenberg insists on privileging outcomes
rather than the methods or choices that lead to them, Bohr repeatedly calls for “another draft” of
the memory, attempting to “get it right” (53). Always, Bohr wants the draft in “plain language,”
a sterile, easy to understand, innocent memory. His desire to smooth out the past reflects the
process of negotiation involved in the recording of history. Bohr’s attempts to remove himself
from his work and from his memory are like the misguided attempts of historians to rewrite the
past to fit comfortably with the present. Such an attempt can only fail, because just like Bohr

6

Different productions interpret the addressee of certain lines differently, subtly changing the
meaning. For example, some of Margrethe’s lines are interpreted as asides in several
productions, but in the 2002 PBS version, these lines are directed to either her husband or
Heisenberg.
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(and Heisenberg, and Margrethe), any recollection of the past is ultimately “from the one
particular viewpoint of a possible observer” (71). With every new draft Bohr demands, Frayn
demonstrates the futility of his endeavor to create a general narrative without him at the center.
Heisenberg is also attempting to view history from outside himself. His attitude is akin to
those who view history as a string of facts that disregard “However we got there, by whatever
combination of high principles and low calculation, of most painfully hard thought and most
painfully childish tears” (Frayn 74). When Bohr and Heisenberg revisit their cloud chamber
experiment, they argue about what it is that they were able to observe, a revealing passage about
the way each of them views history as well. Heisenberg exclaims in frustration, “There isn’t a
track! No orbits! No tracks or trajectories! Only external effects!” (65). Margrethe, coming to her
husband’s defense, insists, “Only there the track is. I’ve seen it myself, as clear as the wake left
by a passing ship” (65). The track to which Margrethe refers is “not a continuous track but a
series of glimpses—a series of collisions between the passing electron and various molecules of
water vapor” (66-7). The track can only be observed by “introducing some new element into the
situation” (66), which will collide with the electrons in the particle. Such a process then requires
interpretation of the data, because the newly introduced element will have an energy of its own,
thereby changing the behavior of the observed particle, however slightly. Interpretation is
required because the trace does not reveal the behavior of the particle as it is (or was). Rather, the
data from the trace reveals how the particle interacted with another element. It is necessary to
understand what is being measured so as to better interpret it. An account of the past testifies of
the nature of an event, rather than the exact details of that event. In a sense, its effect can be
approximated, even if the event is irrecoverable.
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As Heisenberg and Bohr debate this point, Heisenberg creates an analogy in which he is a
photon of light “despatched [sic] into the darkness to find Bohr” (69), an electron. In the
scenario, Heisenberg “manage[s] to collide with [Bohr]….But what’s happened? Look—he’s
been slowed down, he’s been deflected!” (69). Heisenberg would perhaps be happy to observe
just the change in behavior of the particle—those things that can be observed externally—but
Bohr points out the complexities involved in observing this experiment. He reminds Heisenberg:
You also have been deflected! If people can see what’s happened to you, to their
piece of light, then they can work out what must have happened to me! The
trouble is knowing what’s happened to you! Because to understand how people
see you we have to treat you not just as a particle, but as a wave. I have to use not
only your particle mechanics, I have to use the Schrödinger wave function. (69)
As has already been discussed, this complexity is not limited to physics, nor to the way Frayn’s
characters remember their past. While the characters are working through a particularly taxing
scientific query, Frayn is using the episode as an illustration of the way human beings approach
history.
Because history depends on observable facts, it would seem to enjoy a scientific
containability that supposedly provides a readable track through time. However, Frayn reminds
his audience that just as the photon affected the way the particle behaved, so any method of
recording history will have an effect on the record of the past. Just as the observation of a
particle requires human intervention, so the recording of history changes its very nature. This is
not a failing of history or science, merely a fact of the reality that “the universe exists only as a
series of approximations. Only within the limits determined by our relationship with it. Only
through the understanding lodged inside the human head” (Frayn 71-2). This does not have to
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have negative implications, so long as it is recognized and accounted for when it comes time to
draw conclusions. This is why it is so vital for those acting as witness to the past to understand
what within a testimony of the past requires interpretation. Seeberg, Levin and Lenz write that:
The memories of any one individual or collective may only be adequately
analyzed by taking into consideration the environment of this particular person or
collective. The environment is formed by systems that interact with the individual
or collective as well as with each other. This entails that the present environment
is crucial in explaining individual and collective memories…Because memories
of previous experiences are crucial when we interpret new situations, we act and
interact differently according to our memories. As time passes, new events and
experiences also shape our interpretations of old memories, thus giving them new
life as continuous parts of the ongoing present. (5)
In the act of interpreting memory, it is sometimes easy to forget the cultural lenses through
which history is viewed. Frayn sets the play in a time and space that seems to be in some way
above or outside of the narrative. Bohr, Margrethe and Heisenberg have survived beyond their
mortal experience and are now looking at the events in question from a distance that suggests
privileged understanding. But as the play unrolls, the audience discovers that despite being “dead
and gone” (Frayn 3), the characters cannot escape their situation in time, and therefore they
remain subject to their relationship with the past and the future.
In Freud’s theory of Nachträglichkeit, or belatedness, “memory is reprinted, so to speak,
in accordance with later experience” (Phillips 33). In the case of Freud, this reprinting of
memory occurs in the instance of trauma, when a previous experience is only recognized for
what it was after an inciting event, which sheds new light on an old memory. In such instances,
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the past can only be understood in light of the future. This privileging of the future in
understanding the past extends beyond trauma theory into the study and recording of history.
Like Bohr and Heisenberg, historians attempt to create a careful and causal narrative based on
the knowledge and understanding of past events gained through the passage of time. But the
events of the past determine the present, and the present remains open to the determination of the
future. All moments in time are contingent on each other for meaning, and therefore everything
remains incomplete and open-ended. Frayn’s unique setting does not allow for any sort of
advantage based on temporality, because all time exists on the same plane in the play. Just as the
characters slip easily between past and present tense, so too they move through time easily,
returning again and again to “the beginning” (Frayn 38), only to bounce around to events that
occur before and after the infamous visit.
While Frayn’s setting is presented as an otherworldly afterlife, by the end of
Copenhagen, it seems that this afterlife is not so different from the “real” world—the world that
Frayn and his audience inhabit. Even in their state of limbo, Margrethe, Bohr and Heisenberg are
no more able to explain their past actions than those of a complete stranger, because meaning is
still being determined. Eventually Margrethe explodes with frustration at the two men who
continually try—and fail—to remove themselves from their own past. She yells:
I’m sorry, but you want to make everything seem heroically abstract and logical.
And when you tell the story, yes, it all falls into place, it all has a beginning and a
middle and an end. But I was there, and when I remember what it was like I’m
there still, and I look around me and what I see isn’t a story! It’s confusion and
rage and jealousy and tears and no one knowing what things mean or which way
they’re going to go. (73)
33

The construction of history presents a narrative based on a specific moment in time, but time
continues to move and change everything in its wake. Frayn’s conclusion suggests a history that
acknowledges uncertainty—not unknowability—and therefore a necessarily limited perspective
based on the position of the observer. It is not the given right of those in the present to judge the
past, for the present has been shaped by the events of the past, to the point that the only means of
knowing are based on what has happened in the past and how they will unfold in the future.
Through this odd use of time that paradoxically suspends and emphasizes the effects of
real time, Frayn revokes those in the present the right to judgment of the past. This becomes
challenging when the task of interpretation is placed in the hands of the audience, allowing for
multiple potential versions of history. Such a premise has a tendency to anger people. Frayn was
lambasted by several critics (mostly historians and physicists) who accused him of historical
relativism and revisionism. Many read Copenhagen as a disrespectful tarnishing of Bohr’s
legacy. Even more read it as an apologist text, which attempts to clear Heisenberg of any Nazi
sympathies or cooperation. Paul Lawrence Rose, a professor of Jewish studies and European
history, argues that:
Frayn perverts the moral significance of the meeting as well as distorting and
suppressing its scientific and political agenda. Frayn instead sees it as emblematic
of what is for him the central moral paradox of modernity: Was the saintly Bohr,
who helped develop the Allies’ nuclear weapons, actually morally inferior to
Heisenberg, the acolyte of Nazism, who failed for whatever reason to make a
bomb? (B5)
According to Rose, Frayn ignores what historians and scientists know about the meeting between
Heisenberg and Bohr in order to advance his dramatic depiction. He suggests that Frayn plays up
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the ambiguity of history where there is none, placing Heisenberg and Bohr on the same moral
grounds. Other critics suggest that Frayn applied “quantum ethics” to Heisenberg in order to
excuse his participation in the development of the atomic bomb on the basis of irretrievable
intentions. They saw this as a slippery slope leading to a chaotic view of history in which no
guilt can be assigned so long as intentions remain unrecoverable. With this logic, they argued,
there would be nothing to stop the same benevolent ethics from being extended to Hitler.
Certainly, this type of ethics is problematic. But this is also not what Frayn is advocating
in his play. English professor Reed Way Dasenbrock explains that many of the critics who
complain about Frayn’s depiction of the two famed physicists have misread his parallel of the
uncertainty principle to the lives of his characters. Dasenbrock writes, “The uncertainty principle
is in the first place a description of the interaction of a particle and an observer. What it says is
that the observer has to choose what it is that he or she wishes to know exactly: if one chooses to
focus on the speed of a particle, then its speed can be measured exactly, but its location cannot
be. Or vice-versa” (226). Such a clarification of Heisenberg’s principle helps to then clarify how
to read Frayn’s take on Heisenberg’s visit to Copenhagen, and perhaps, history in general.
Dasenbrock continues, “Nothing here suggests that the knowledge one has is in any sense
uncertain, only that there are temporal limits to what we can know. In other words, our
knowledge of an event as it unfolds is necessarily partial, because our location as an observer
limits what we can observe” (226). In the above quotation, Dasenbrock articulates what is really
at stake in Frayn’s drama. Rather than offering a view of history in which nothing can be known
for certain, Frayn underscores how any historical account is necessarily and unavoidably limited.
With his small cast of three, Frayn demonstrates the triangulation that art makes possible
when approaching history. The witness (the author or artist) must always find a balance between
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what Dasenbrock terms externalism (what can be observed) and internalism (intentions, motives,
anxiety, trepidation—in short, what cannot be observed or known for certain) in order to fairly
judge. Dasenbrock argues that because historians are limited by discipline to what can be
observed, the artist offers something that the historian cannot. He writes, “the playwright's
imagination can help the historian explain what actually happened…because [he or she] can
speculate about unobservables much more freely than a historian can” (232). Historians and
scientists, those who depend on hard facts and proven hypotheses, may cringe at the notion of
speculation, but Frayn’s play is an attempt to remind audiences that all historical narratives
involve and necessitate some degree of speculation. Dasenbrock is quick to note, however, that
“this attempt to speculate about the thoughts and intentions of the characters does not move us
into a relativist terrain: nothing here suggests that the truth is viewpoint-relative or that all the
different versions are equal in truth-value” (229). This speculation that Dasenbrock proposes is
akin to memory. Just because memory is personal does not mean that anything interpretation is
valid or that everyone is left to choose his or her own version of history. But the personal nature
of memory requires the witness of that memory to understand how to interpret the information
(both external and internal) available in the testimony.
Frayn’s presentation of quantum ethics provides a system whereby memory is understood
based on the perspective of the observer. The careful use of Heisenberg and Bohr’s science as an
analogy for interpreting memory suggests a necessary awareness of the role of the observer and
the standards of measurement being applied. Like the traces in the cloud chamber, a testimony
does not reveal the event itself, but rather the effects of the memory as it moves through time and
collides with other events. The observer must read the traces of these collisions in order to
understand what they reveal about the original event.
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Brief Glimpses: A Resistance Scrapbook
Frayn’s award-winning drama presents a way of looking at history that accepts the
uncertainty inherent in memory. Analyzing a second text will help to further illustrate the way
that acknowledging uncertainty opens up an understanding of history rather than negating the
possibility of historical truth. In Los Angeles, California during the 1960s, Viggo Bjørn Sibbern
compiled a five-volume scrapbook that included materials he had saved for over two decades.
Sibbern was born in Sorø, Denmark in 1916 and was trained as a bookbinder. During World War
II, he worked as an inspector for the Danish police force, which was under Nazi control. He used
his background in bookbinding to print forged documents and anti-occupation literature for the
Danish resistance movement, fighting against the Nazis to help protect Danish Jews and fellow
resistance fighters. After the war, Sibbern and his wife, Tove, immigrated to Canada, eventually
arriving in the United States in 1955 and settling near Los Angeles, California. He again put his
bookbinding skills to use in the compilation of documents, photographs and artifacts in an
extensive multi-volume scrapbook about the war. Shortly before his death in 1967, Sibbern
turned possession of the scrapbook over to Ruth and Dell Scott, a couple he knew through his
involvement with a scholarship foundation called Thanks to Scandinavia. The volumes have
since been donated to the United States Holocaust Museum and Memorial in Washington, D.C.
Through its very medium and content, the scrapbook presents a multi-layered text that
exposes various tensions in the relationship between history and memory. This section will
explore some of these tensions. First, I will introduce the idea of the scrapbook as a text and
justify its analysis by situating it as postmodern historical literature, using the writing of Linda
Hutcheon as a basis for my conversation. Using this theory, I will explore the content and form
of the scrapbook to discover how Sibbern navigates his complex position between history and
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memory. I will analyze his use of language as he struggles to accommodate for the splitting of
the self across time that occurs in the act of inscribing memory. Sibbern’s writing suggests a
frustration with his lack of control over future interpretations of the text, eventually conceding
the inevitable impossibility of such totality. The scrapbook as a medium withholds the possibility
of control because of the way that it fragments narrative voice and time. Scrapbooks are
therefore an excellent illustration of the multi-directional trajectory of the archive, which
attempts to preserve the past and anticipate the future in a single moment. In order to highlight
these complexities, I will apply Jacques Derrida’s notion of the archive to Sibbern’s text in an
attempt to understand the implications of his project. To conclude this section, I will
problematize Sibbern’s declared purposes for creating the book, and attempt to address the
question of whom this text is for and what they are to make of it.
Scrapbooks are not a common subject in the field of literary studies. They are often
viewed as low-culture, kitschy, craft projects rather than counted as a work of art, literature or
history. This is because they do not connote any sort of artistic ability or mastery of language,
and they often take as their subject a highly personal and/or narrow topic. Sibbern’s scrapbook is
hardly an exception to the first two points. The items on each page are not arranged according to
any aesthetic design, and his work is stylistically and organizationally awkward in places.
However, Sibbern’s scrapbook has a broader scope than his own life during the Second World
War. Because Sibbern was involved in the Danish resistance movement, his memory overlaps
with historical events. His work points to a larger narrative regarding the resistance and the war,
allowing for the same approximation Frayn advocates for in Copenhagen. Through both content
and form, Sibbern’s scrapbook testifies to the traumatic nature of the war.
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In a discussion of memory and history, Sibbern’s scrapbook presents a fascinating
document. In the space of nearly 250 pages that span five volumes, Sibbern collects newspaper
clippings, photographs, ticket stubs, rations vouchers, Nazi propaganda, resistance song books,
badges, arm bands, falsified passports and a variety of other materials. Each item is explained in
a handwritten annotation from Sibbern. Sometimes these annotations are brief, but more often
they are several sentences long, providing context and explanations of the object. Within these
annotations, Sibbern will also include cross-references, pointing the reader to a related volume
and page number for further clarification. The sprawling web of documents begins with a
booklet attached to an otherwise blank page. Sibbern has handwritten an English translation of
the title “‘Civil Defense’—‘Information booklet No. 1’” next to the book, and included the
caption, “Way back in 1938 the danish government sent out regulations about Black-Outs and
what to do in case of Air Attack. People laughed. Nobody believed there could come another war
[sic]” (1: 2). From this tragically ironic opening, Sibbern moves through a loose chronology of
the events of World War II and the Nazi occupation in Denmark.
The scrapbook is comprised of different voices, narratives and time structures. While
Sibbern may not consider himself a self-conscious author, he inevitably becomes aware of the
complexities of the very medium he is working in. Flyers, photographs, newspaper headlines and
posters sometimes illustrate and at other times interrupt the narrative Sibbern constructs as he
moves through history. Often, the items in the collection do not lend themselves well to being
sorted according to date. Sibbern struggles to determine “What comes first? Even better: Who
comes first? and second?” (Derrida 37). The question of when to introduce certain “characters”
or concepts disrupts the chronology he attempts to assert on his collection. For example, it is not
until the fourth volume, when his narrative has reached 1943, chronologically, that several
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Figure 1 A page from volume 4 of Sibbern's scrapbook, formally introducing his readers to Hitler for the first time.
Images used with permission from the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.

photographs of Hitler appear alongside the caption, “In unbelievable short time (1933-39) [the
Nazis] had taken total power in Germany, built one of the largest War-Machines the world ever
saw, thrown Thousands upon Thousands of political opponents in Concentration camps and
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executed the first million of millions of European Jews [sic]” (4: 4, see Figure 1). Here and
elsewhere, Sibbern grapples with the challenge of placing information that is relevant throughout
all five volumes, yet does not belong to a specific moment in time that makes it easy to arrange.
Knowing who Hitler is and his significance to the other items is perhaps a given,
regardless of the audience. However, other less obvious information (like details about the
resistance group Sibbern is part of and the specific role he plays in their efforts) also arrives
belatedly or else in fragments throughout. Sibbern’s cross-references are an attempt to combat
the complex temporal composition of his work, but they further disrupt a chronological
trajectory. He can never make available all the necessary information in sequential order,
because his text—like his memories—has no one specific order. As Felman and Laub explain,
Sibbern’s experience, “although real, took place outside the parameters of ‘normal’ reality, such
as causality, sequence, place and time” (69). It thus conveys Sibbern’s memory not of the past,
but of “an event that could not and did not proceed through to its completion, has no ending,
attained no closure, and therefore, as far as [Sibbern is] concerned, continues into the present and
is current in every respect” (69). Like the arrangement of the scrapbook, other metatextual
elements of the medium bear testimony to Sibbern’s experience. These elements include the
margins, gutters and other white spaces of the text that surround each artifact and its description.
The reader encounters as much that remains unsaid and unrecorded as that which has been
written.
There are gaps, not only in the empty spaces, but in the different ways to experience the
text. Several pages include a booklet, a pamphlet, a foldout poster or something similar. These
texts within Sibbern’s text also ask to be read, but in those moments, Sibbern relinquishes an
“individual authorial voice” (Katriel and Farrell 11), which is subverted “as the mode of
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detachment and re-adherence, of graft and citation, collage inevitably undermines the authority
of the individual self” (Perloff 76). As the reader moves through the multi-layered text, they do
so without a prescribed reading strategy. They can choose to flip through the pages of inserted
texts, to translate them and read them closely, or to skip them altogether. The reader can also
decide to follow Sibbern’s cross-references or to read in a more linear, traditional way. Each
encounter with the text will be different, which points towards a multiplicity of interpretive
possibilities.

Figure 2 A page from Sibbern's scrapbook, including an
unlabeled booklet.

Figure 3 The same page shown in Figure 2, with the booklet
opened.

The collage of historical artifacts assembled in a single text and stitched together with a
loosely chronological non-narrative that encourages an unconventional navigation reveals itself
as utterly postmodern. As is typical in postmodern literature, Sibbern demonstrates a self42

consciousness of the limitations of his text. He is careful to acknowledge his position as always
and inescapably subject to the present. In so doing, he demands that his text be read and
interpreted according to the reader. Literary theorist Linda Hutcheon, discussing postmodernism,
borrows a quotation from Lionel Gossman to summarize the complex nature of history as it
relates to reality and language, suggesting that postmodern history and literature “conceive of
their work as exploration, testing, creation of new meanings, rather than as disclosure or
revelation of meaning already in some sense ‘there,’ but not immediately perceptible” (Gossman
38-9). Sibbern's use of historical documents in such a highly personal medium emphasizes that
what appears to be undisputed fact must also be interpreted. This is not an effort to deny the
significance of the documents and objects, but to question a stable meaning. Hutcheon clarifies
that “in arguing that history does not exist except as text, it does not stupidly and ‘gleefully’ deny
that the past existed, but only that its accessibility to us now is entirely conditioned by textuality.
We cannot know the past except through its texts: its documents, its evidence, even its eyewitness accounts are texts” (16). In this sense, there is not a denial of history so much as a
questioning of any final interpretation of it. The reader or the audience of history must
continually engage with history and ask questions of it. In works like the scrapbook, this
engagement includes an analysis of the form as well as the content of the text. It requires an
understanding of the spaces between and the ways the items connect. Sibbern seems anxious to
provide an explanation, but also painfully aware of his lack of ability to convey meaning through
words and objects. His own memory is much richer and more complex than even his elaborate
scrapbook can communicate.
The compulsion to explain everything and his resulting frustration because of his inability
to do so is a problem Sibbern wrestles with throughout all five volumes of the scrapbook. In the
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process of creating the scrapbook, he unavoidably and inadvertently realizes that despite his best
efforts, much of what he experienced “will not stand out in the following pages” (Sibbern 1: 1).
He acknowledges his frustrations in the dedication to the scrapbook included at the beginning of
the first volume. In the dedication, Sibbern dedicates the volumes to his only daughter, Lisa, and
enumerates his reasons for creating the scrapbook. His reasoning suggests an attempt to navigate
the complex relationship between the past and the present, private and public narrative, memory
and history. He defines the limitations of the collection, describes what he hopes his daughter
will gain from reading it, makes a request for the eventual fate of the work, and issues a warning
to the reader. Clearly, Sibbern intends for the scrapbook to communicate much of his experience
to his daughter and to help her understand her parents’ past. However, the process of compilation
and annotation has exposed an inability to convey precisely his experience. Sibbern’s final
paragraph includes a plea to Lisa to ask questions about what she reads. This invitation is an
attempt to account both for holes in the existing narrative and the relentless march of time which
changes and shapes interpretation.
The anxiety of misunderstanding is common in the creation of scrapbooks, where an
object acts as a signifier to an undetermined or unshared signified. In a study about the process of
scrapbook making, linguistics professor Thomas Farrell and communications professor Tamar
Katriel surmised:
At times, the pictures and objects included in the scrapbook are accompanied by
some written caption or commentary. But even then the “story” they tell is never
complete; it might be meaningful to outsiders in a generic sense as an account of
“a possible life,” with the items serving as tokens of culturally shared types of
events or experiences…However…there is a kind of private poignance to all these
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artifacts that seems to invite and yet defy the onlooker’s gaze. The ways these
potentially meaningful occasions were individuated in significance for the
particular person cannot be directly discerned from just leafing through the
scrapbook. (10)
Sibbern attempts to provide adequate explanations of the materials assembled in the scrapbook,
but they can never fully convey his experience. This is because the memories are situated within
an entire network of context gained over a lifetime of experiences. This is not to say that the
scrapbook holds no value to anyone but Sibbern, but to recognize that despite all that he has
saved and assembled to pass on, there are certain things that cannot be captured within the pages.
It is as if:
The owner’s active mediation between this skeletal text and its occasional reader
is necessary as a bridge. This bridge seems to bring together the onlooker’s
general cultural knowledge of the genre and an appreciation of the owner’s
subjective experience which [his] presence infuses into each of its tokens. Thus,
whereas the scrapbook’s coherence is grounded in general cultural assumptions,
the particularized meaning and significance of each scrapbook lies in the
privileged eye of its maker and protagonist. (Katriel and Farrell 10)
Sibbern’s daughter and any other reader of the scrapbook can certainly make sense of the
included information from a general cultural perspective. In fact, the rare photographs and
original documents would likely be a helpful or at least interesting addition to any study of
World War II. Sibbern himself is aware of the objective value of these artifacts and even states in
his dedication that “People in Denmark wished to buy certain items for a rather large sum of
money…as many items are ‘One of a Kind’ [sic]” (1: 1). However, Sibbern is attempting to do
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more than supplement his daughter’s text books. There is an underlying personal emphasis,
despite the fact that many of the entries in Sibbern’s scrapbook make no mention of him. At the
heart of any scrapbook, Katriel and Farrell argue, is a presentation of the self. They explain,
“Scrapbooks are…shared with people who did not share with the owner the past times covered in
the scrapbook. In such cases, reminiscing is oriented toward self-display through the recounting
of stories and anecdotes about the owner’s past life for an interested audience” (13). Sibbern's
scrapbook, similarly, testifies to a self, regardless of the fact that his subject is the Danish
resistance movement. Inherent to the scrapbook is the subjectivity of its creator.
As has been previously mentioned, Sibbern is obliquely aware of this subjectivity.
Whereas Frayn deliberately manipulates the subjectivity of his characters in order to underscore
its inevitability, Sibbern’s understanding of his own limited perspective arrives rather
unwittingly, and in the end it seems he foregrounds his individual position in an effort to then
move past it. In the dedication, he sets some parameters for his collection, explaining what it is
and what it is not. He clarifies that “It could as a whole be titled: ‘Denmark during the War and
the German Occupation’, but it is not supposed to be a complete history from that period, but
rather it will show brief glimpses from the war years in Denmark, as seen with the eyes of
average people” (1: 1). This clarification comes early in the dedication, establishing a personal
perspective rather than claiming to be an official history. In fact, Sibbern goes on to suggest that
in order to understand the contents of the scrapbook, his daughter “will probably have to read up
on the history of the Second World War” (1: 1). Despite hundreds of pages of actual artifacts and
first hand testimony, Sibbern is faced with the need to provide context because of the limitations
of an individual perspective. Each item is steeped in meaning for him, which may not translate
easily to the reader. Katriel and Farrell explain that even in a scrapbook like Sibbern’s, where the
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collection is assembled in anticipation of future readers, the collection as a whole reflects the life
of the scrapbook’s creator. They write:
Despite the future orientation inherent in putting together a scrapbook, the
decision to include or exclude an item is based upon the owner’s judgment of
significance at the time of compilation. In this respect scrapbooks are a
celebration of subjectivity: the cumulative product of a series of decisions by a
unique individual, with a unique life-history…What is retained in it are not the
items as such, but the items as significant tokens, as concrete indices of
meaningful contexts, even if those contexts can be recaptured only in a
fragmentary way. (8)
Throughout the first half of the dedication, Sibbern emphasizes the personal nature of the
scrapbook and the story it tells. He explains that he gathered most of the collection with help
from his wife, as well as his parents. He credits his father for storing the collected documents and
artifacts at great personal risk and despite the money the more unique items could have fetched if
sold. As it appears in the dedication, it was very important to Sibbern to pass the collection on to
his daughter, and for her to “keep [it] intact” (Sibbern 1: 1). It is only as a whole that the
collection testifies to the message Sibbern is attempting to convey.
To complicate this problem even further, it seems that Sibbern is conflicted as to who his
audience is. Up until this point, all stated intentions for the scrapbook are extremely personal.
The timeline for the project, however, reveals that Sibbern’s collection was likely intended for a
wider audience. Lisa was born in 1956, after Sibbern and Tove immigrated to America. Despite
her father’s insistence that “We have saved it for you” (1:1), the gathering and preserving of the
various items began well before Lisa was born. Of course, it is possible that Sibbern began
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collecting documents for any of his hypothetical progeny, 7 and there is no doubt that Sibbern had
his daughter in mind throughout the creation of the scrapbook, regardless of his reasons for
beginning the collection. However, a closer look at the dedication and annotations indicates that
Sibbern collected, preserved and compiled the scrapbook for an audience outside of (or in
addition to) his direct descendants. He tells his daughter, “if you ever want to part with it—offer
it to a museum either here [in the United States] or in Denmark” (1: 1). Given that the scrapbook
is now in the archives of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, this suggestion is
neither shocking nor inappropriate, but it does raise questions. His position as a witness is
affected by who he is testifying to, making Sibbern’s anticipated audience an important element
of the scrapbook. Just paragraphs earlier, Sibbern explicitly stated that the scrapbook is not
supposed to be taken as a general account. Yet his request that his daughter donate it to a
museum suggests that he has positioned himself in such a way so as to address a multitude of
audiences. In this effort, he necessarily fragments the self he is presenting.
He acknowledges this possibility in the annotations throughout the scrapbook. The
annotations are a unique blend of biographical and historical summary and they hint towards the
Sibbern’s anticipated audiences. While most of the annotations are simply explanatory, they are
also often directly addressed to his daughter. If the explanation involves him, he will first refer to
himself as “your father.” However, after this initial reference, Sibbern then switches into first
person. In one of several examples of this flexible perspective, Sibbern describes recruiting a
7

Interestingly, it appears that Sibbern did have a son who was alive when he began his
collection. On Sibbern’s United States naturalization record from November 9, 1961, he lists two
children: Lisa, born in New York in 1956 and Sven, born in Denmark in 1942. He indicates
(rather ambiguously) that both Lisa and Sven reside with their mother. Sibbern married Tove
Gregersen in Roskilde, Denmark in 1951. Tove’s naturalization record lists Lisa as her only
child, suggesting that Sven is the child of a previous relationship and that he remained in
Denmark with his mother.
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young man named Dres Work to illustrate some literature for the resistance movement. Next to a
doodle of a clown, Sibbern explains, “At the very first staff meeting we had, [Dres Work] drew
this Beauty…Your Father liked it so well, it was saved, and later I asked Dres to illustrate an
‘underground’ book…we were working on [sic]” (Sibbern 5: 8). This is an inclusive act on
Sibbern’s part. As he switches between these different perspectives, he attempts to account for
any and all who may read the scrapbook. In another instance, he again uses this shifting point of
view to recount his experience of being arrested and questioned. He writes, “Your Father was
questioned daily for 6 days. I was under ‘suspicion’, but had my papers (vol. 3 page 7-8) and my
answers ready. One day I was being questioned for a little more than 14 Hours. I fell asleep,
sitting up, and they gave me up. The next day, I was released [sic]” (5: 17). His narration
simultaneously distances the audience and draws them closer. By referring to himself in the third
person, he separates himself from the subject, almost as if recounting the story of someone else,
who did not survive the war. But then he begins to use first person, focalizing the narrative from
his individual perspective.
Through this use of language, Sibbern underscores the complexity not only of his own
narrator position but also of his complex relation to the different temporal moments of the
scrapbook. In many ways, he is testifying of another man’s life. When he compiles the
scrapbook, he is writing in America, from a safe distance, at least twenty years removed from the
events, knowing what happens next. But the memory of the past is also very much a part of him,
his experiences casting a long shadow on the events of his life. As Katriel and Farrell articulate,
“The contexts of narration and of reminiscing underlie the dual temporal orientation of the
scrapbook experience; and although they are brought into close contact, they are never
collapsed” (8). It is perhaps because these events and objects continue to resonate in his life that
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Sibbern’s inability to tell a complete story is revealed. There is no way for him to arrive at either
the end or the beginning. Just as he could not determine a satisfactory organization of those items
that stand outside chronology, in the act of witnessing, Sibbern is faced with the reality that there
is no end to this story. Whereas most scrapbooks attempt to convey “the unity and coherence of
life” (Katriel and Farrell 14), Sibbern is quite open about the lack of coherence in his work. He
describes it as a series of “glimpses” (1: 1) and encourages his daughter to ask questions,
opening up a conversation rather than foreclosing on any definitive meaning.
As a series of glimpses, an attempt to represent the past for the sake of future generations,
Sibbern’s text manifests itself as an archive. Pierre Nora suggests that archives are assembled in
the anxiety of the present; items and records are gathered together in order to freeze a moment in
the past and to prepare for an unknown future. He writes:
The fear that everything is on the verge of disappearing, coupled with anxiety
about the precise significance of the present and uncertainty about the future,
invests even the humblest testimony, the most modest vestige, with the dignity of
being potentially memorable…We have felt called upon to accumulate fragments,
reports, documents, images, and speeches—any tangible sign of what was…We
cannot know in advance what should be remembered, hence we refrain from
destroying anything and put everything in archives instead. (8-9)
Nora identifies the same challenge that Sibbern faces in assembling his collection. Unaware of
what will be relevant, Sibbern has saved a wide variety of documents and artifacts. His decision
to preserve the items is “both retrospectively and prospectively oriented. It is a gesture towards
the past, an attempt to salvage some aspects of one’s ‘lived past’ from the ravages of human
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forgetfulness, but with an eye to a future for which this constructed past can be a meaningful
antecedent” (Katriel and Farrell 7).
Likewise, Jacques Derrida, in his book, Archive Fever, explores the nature and function
of the archive, noting the dual function identified by Katriel and Farrell. He suggests that the
archive is both “institutive” and “conservative” (Derrida 7). For Derrida, an archive is comprised
of externalized memory; the moment something is inscribed, it becomes an archive. This archive
becomes a way to preserve a remembered past, fulfilling its “traditional” role (7). But the archive
becomes “revolutionary” by “making the law” (7). In other words, on the one hand, the archive
shaped by tradition. But it is also critical in shaping the future. The tension between these two
functions of the archive is what Derrida explores throughout his book, and also what plays out in
Sibbern’s scrapbook. In one sense, Sibbern preserves the past by compiling an archive that is
external to himself. He has inscribed the memory through writing and collage so that the memory
can survive him. However, in the act of inscription, a violence occurs. He has placed the memory
outside of himself and so has necessarily decontextualized it. Each of these items has
significance as it relates to him, and the archive attempts to remove the individual from its
construction.
Despite this attempted separation, the archive remains the product of the individual it
attempts to erase. All that is unsaid or excluded also becomes inscribed, “because repression is
an archivization” as well (Derrida 64). The archive merely indicates that which has been lost
through archivization and that which has been repressed and therefore preserved in archivization.
Similar to Nora’s configuration of the archive, Derrida notes the feverish anxiety of the present
to preserve the past in light of an anticipated future. However, when the future arrives (in the
present), what has been saved from the past is deemed unable to answer those questions that are
51

demanded of it. Sibbern tries to anticipate the questions those in the future will have by saving as
much as he can and by keeping “the collection intact” (Sibbern 1: 1). By saving certain items
throughout his life and then including them in the scrapbook, Sibbern “delivered [them] from
their ephemeral existence as transient objects in the world, objects which turn into rubbish with
the erosion of their use-value. Instead of such an untimely though routinized demise, [the items]
are redeemed as elements within a new text: the life-story recounted in words and objects”
(Katriel and Farrell 5). By inscribing these items in the archive, Sibbern destines them to have
significance in the future. Derrida explains the way that “the technical structure of the archiving
archive also determines the structure of the archivable content even in its very coming into
existence and in its relationship to the future. The archivization produces as much as it records
the event” (17). In this sense, the items or the events on their own do not hold meaning. But as
part of the archive, they hold the all the possibilities of meaning that remains to be determined in
the future. Like Freud’s principle of belatedness, it is only in the future that the archive can be
understood. This also means that nothing is outside of the archive, there is no locatable
beginning or end. For Derrida, the future is always being anticipated, the past always being
mourned, and the present exists as the moment when all of this takes place.
The scrapbook is not a collection of old documents and objects that cannot convey their
intended meaning. It is a collection of old documents and objects that must be read in order to
create meaning. The objects do not passively signify. Sibbern speaks from a personal
perspective, foregrounding everything he writes in his role as Lisa’s father and as a Dane who
resisted the Nazis. His perspective is underscored, not to convince people to adopt his view, but
in order to highlight its limitations. He speaks from a particular time, place and bias. He recounts
the events of the Danish resistance several years after the fact, as a father and a naturalized
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American. His dedication reveals his hesitancy to conclude his narrative. He pleas to keep the
conversation open, to contextualize information, to ask questions, and to engage. The medium of
a scrapbook allows for such an openness: a new page or volume can always be added.
Ultimately, the scrapbook is meant to help Lisa and other readers create their own memory of the
resistance. Among the photographs and other documents that indicate objectivity and historical
accuracy, Sibbern emphasizes his subjectivity and invites his readers to do the same. The project
seems to be an effort to remember in order to move forward, acknowledging that the past is not
fully understood, even in hindsight. In his final statement in the dedication, Sibbern suggests that
this scrapbook is meant to open a conversation, not to become the final word on the topic of the
Danish resistance or the war in Denmark. He reminds Lisa (and other readers) that “we [Sibbern
and his wife] will still be around—for a long time, we hope—when you have read and looked
through all this. So, just ask questions” (1: 1). This seems to be an invitation that only his
daughter and other readers who know him personally would be able to take advantage of.
However, the sentiment behind it suggests that the past is relative to the future. Given Sibbern’s
prior recognition of a readership outside his own family, this invitation to engage with the past
can also be taken as a general suggestion. The resistance, the war, Sibbern’s life—nothing is
understood fully by reading the scrapbook. The significance of these events cannot be
determined finally because the effects continue to multiply through time. Each new reader will
find new meaning through an intentional conversation with the text.
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Uncertain Witnessing
As a Derridian archive, Sibbern’s scrapbook points more to the empty spaces than to a
cohesive past made from the collected items. Like any account of history that relies on historical
“fact” without theorizing the spaces between, the scrapbook cannot deliver the past to the reader
in the present. Instead, the past must be understood in terms of the present. The scrapbook, I
have argued, reveals the complex relationship between the past and the present. Sibbern writes
about his past in light of what he imagines future readers will find relevant or need to know. He
can only write from the present, contemplating both the past and the future of that moment. But
time refuses to be arrested, and so the relationship to both the past and the future is everchanging. Therefore, Sibbern’s readers have an obligation to interpret the collection, realizing
that the questions being posed to the text are likely questions that are not inherent within the
work. To gain access to those answers, the reader must leverage his or her own situation in the
“eternal” present and the ways in which he or she has been shaped by the past. This is the human
condition, not to be lamented. Andreas Huyssen, an important scholar in the field of memory
studies, writes:
Given this selective and permanently shifting dialogue between present and past,
we have come to recognize that our present will inevitably have an impact on
what and how we remember. The point is to understand that process, not to regret
it in the mistaken belief in some ultimately pure, complete, and transcendent
memory. It follows that the strongly remembered past will always be inscribed in
our present, from feeding our unconscious desires to guiding our most conscious
actions. At the same time, the strongly remembered past may turn into mythic
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memory. It is not immune to ossification, and may become a stumbling block to
the needs of the present rather than an opening in the continuum of history. (250)
Huyssen’s point is that a focus on recapturing “pure,” uninhibited memory is both impossible
and undesirable. Rather, “As time passes, new events and experiences also shape our
interpretations of old memories, thus giving them new life as continuous parts of the ongoing
present” (Seeberg, Levin and Lenz 5). To hold too tightly to a past interpretation of the past is to
deny the function of memory and therefore to ossify it so that it becomes a stumbling block
rather than a stepping-stone on the way to the future.
Copenhagen is an attempt to suspend the tight grasp on the past that history claims
regarding the meeting between Bohr and Heisenberg. Michael Frayn based his depictions of
Werner Heisenberg and Niels and Margrethe Bohr on information found in letters, journals and
other historical documents, but, as he admits, “Even when all the external evidence has been
mastered, the only way into the protagonists’ heads is through the imagination” (97). After
Copenhagen was published, the Bohr family released several drafts of unsent letters written from
Bohr to Heisenberg regarding their meeting in 1941. It seems that in reality, both Bohr and
Heisenberg were preoccupied throughout their lives with understanding the meaning of this
meeting. But both physicists (and critics of Frayn’s play) failed to realize that meaning is not to
be found in attempting to discover a narrative that satisfied both of their memories. Frayn
concedes, “It is imaginable that there is some evidence, somewhere, that would put beyond doubt
what occurred at the meeting. But that still would not put beyond doubt what Niels Bohr thought
Heisenberg’s intentions were, and what Heisenberg had thought Niels Bohr understood of the
meeting. That would be just as elusive as ever” (PBS Hollywood Presents). Even among the
unimpeachable facts of history, the unknown remains to be navigated through imagination.
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The demand for imagination is emphasized in both the scrapbook and Copenhagen. If
uncertainty always impedes a full understanding, if gaps appear in even the most extensive
archive, the value of these and any other text or history may be questioned. Studies of history
and even literature often demand a sort of finite understanding, a truth declaration or a
conclusive statement. But what these two texts offer in being read together is a refusal to
foreclose on the absolute meaning of the past. Both Sibbern and Frayn emphasize subjectivity at
the heart of events that history does not want to be subjective. While Sibbern recounts the events
of the Danish resistance movement using external evidence, his archive is assembled in the only
way he could possibly do so, with himself at the center. And while Heisenberg, Bohr and
Margrethe are debating an event that had worldwide implications, they are really attempting to
understand their own personal memories.
The attempt to understand history begins with an attempt to see the self and to recognize
the role of the self in the creation of history. Both Sibbern and the characters in Frayn’s play
attempt to navigate that distance in order for history to even have a hold on their memory. This
requires the creation of new memory in the present, memory that foregrounds subjectivity. Bohr
remarks, “Throughout history we [mankind] keep finding ourselves displaced. We keep exiling
ourselves to the periphery of things” (Frayn 71). The solution he suggests is to “put man back at
the centre of the universe” (71). The climax of Copenhagen comes when Frayn’s characters
realize that “one single soul [is] the emperor of the universe, no less than each of us” (91). They
finally accept that each man can only see from his own point of view, and each individual must
account for that. With man at the center of the universe, a blindness occurs. Man alone is unable
to see his position in history without “introducing some new element” (Frayn 67) with which the
self at the center can interface.
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At this crucial moment in Frayn’s play, the characters realize not only their position at the
center of the universe, but the need to “collide” with others in order to understand how they
behave within the system. Heisenberg articulates this dual realization, sensing the gaps in his
vision as he interacts with Bohr and Margrethe. He ponders: “Here I am at the centre of the
universe, and yet all I can see are two smiles that don’t belong to me…I can feel a third smile in
the room, very close to me. Could it be the one I suddenly see for a moment in the mirror there?
And is the awkward stranger wearing it in any way connected with this presence that I can feel in
the room? This all-enveloping, unobserved presence?” (86-7). All three of the characters
experience this blindness that belies their subjectivity, and each of them navigates it through a
triangulation with the others. Bohr tells the audience “I glance at Margrethe, and for a moment I
see what she can see and I can’t—myself” (87). In order to understand the past, he must
understand his role in it, which requires him to search the gazes of Margrethe and Heisenberg to
measure how he has been “deflected” (69). Frayn teaches his audience that it is not solid
conclusions that are discovered by measuring deflection, but instead what is discovered is “a
series of approximations” that exist “only within the limits determined by our relationship with
it. Only through the understanding lodged inside the human head” (71-2). The knowledge gained
from interacting with the text is contingent on the relationship the reader has with what is (and is
not) there. This is why subjectivity is essential to interpretation, and not because the reader can
choose to make whatever meaning he or she chooses.
In an epilogue to the 2002 PBS Hollywood Presents production of Copenhagen, Michael
Frayn suggests that “This play is about the difficulty of knowing why people do what they do. It
is also about the difficulty of knowing why one does what one does oneself. And in the end, it
comes to the conclusion that in order to understand ourselves, we have to talk to other people.
57

We have to see our ideas reflected in other people.” Sibbern comes to the same conclusion when
he urges his daughter to “ask questions” (1: 1). Both texts are asking the audience to witness to
history from their own perspective.
Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub have one of the best known and exceptionally written
studies on testimony and witnessing. 8 Felman is a comparative literature professor and Holocaust
scholar, while Laub is coming to the study as a medically trained psychoanalyst. In their study,
they explore what it means to witness. One of their key points is that witnessing is a creative act.
By bearing witness to the experience of another, “the listener…is party to the creation of
knowledge” (Laub 57). The audience is the co-creator of a new memory, that of the testimony.
Marianne Hirsch, another important scholar of memory studies, applies Felman and Laub’s
findings to her own study, discovering that witnessing creates a “triangulation of looking…in
itself an act of memory” which reveals itself to be “an act in the present on the part of a subject
who constitutes herself by means of a series of identifications across temporal, spatial, and
cultural divides” (Hirsch 6). The listener must recognize himself in order to be “at the same time
a witness to the trauma and a witness to himself” (Laub 58). Understanding the self and the
history being witnessed is essential, because the witness is bearing testimony “to an event that
has not yet come into existence, in spite of the overwhelming and compelling nature of the
reality of its occurrence” (57). Think, for example, of the event being witnessed in Copenhagen.
The implications of that event did not exist at the time it took place, they came belatedly, when
the German bomb project failed and the Manhattan Project succeeded. Those in the present want
8

Felman and Laub’s book, Testimony, uses survivors of the Holocaust as its subject. My use of
Felman and Laub’s work is not an effort to equate the events in Copenhagen and Sibbern’s
scrapbook to the suffering and trauma of the Jews during the Holocaust. However, I believe that
their work has important applications beyond the atrocities suffered by the Jews during World
War II.
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to understand Heisenberg and Bohr’s involvement in these respective endeavors, a question that
cannot be answered simply through remembering what happened.
There is an ethical component that requires an understanding of the past and the present
in order to know what is being witnessed. Laub cautions that an awareness of the past can lead a
listener to use the testimony as a confirmation of what they already know or believe, but a good
listener will be able to use their knowledge in order to “hear the silence” of testimony and to
help bring into existence what can otherwise not be witnessed (Laub 58). Katrine Antonsen is a
literary scholar who specializes in the study of ethics in Frayn’s works. Speaking of ethics in
regards to Copenhagen, she suggests:
The play allows its audiences to recognize the ethical issues actually faced by the
three historical characters in 1941. It further invites audiences to imagine to what
extent these historical characters might have perceived these moral challenges and
how they might have responded to their perceptions. Finally, it puts audiences in a
position to consider the ethical adequacy of Frayn’s depiction of such challenges,
perceptions, and responses. (122)
Witnessing accounts for uncertainty, because it places the audience outside of the realm of
observable external variables and instead studies the deflections of these variables to imagine
possible explanations. Witnessing is an approximation based on the behavior of the external
variables, but not limited to them.
On a certain level, memory is always subject to history. In Sibbern’s scrapbook, the
historical significance of his collection cannot be denied. However, it is in the work of memory
that what he bears witness to is revealed. The pictures, documents and artifacts are meaningless
if Sibbern has no one to hear his testimony. This is why he asks his daughter to ask questions,
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because his archive is inadequate to express his experience, just as the records of bugged
conversations at Farm Hall will not help Heisenberg convey his intentions (Frayn 81). These
records contain in them the same uncertainty as the trace of an observed particle. They provide
only a series of glimpses. However, this does not mean that they should be dismissed, only that
the second pillar of the Copenhagen Interpretation must also be established: complementarity.
Heisenberg muses that:
Exactly where you go as you ramble around is of course completely determined
by your genes and the various forces acting on you. But it’s also completely
determined by your own entirely inscrutable whims from one moment to the next.
So we can’t completely understand your behavior without seeing it both ways at
once, and that’s impossible. Which means that your extraordinary peregrinations
are not fully objective aspects of the universe. They exist only partially, through
the efforts of [an observer], as our minds shift endlessly back and forth between
the two approaches. (69-70)
Complementarity is the means by which to account for uncertainty through the imagination of
multiple possibilities at once. Witnessing is the act of the observer that balances out the behavior
of the subject according to what can be seen and that which can only be imagined. Creative
memory thus flourishes in the midst of the uncertainty of history.
The coupling of uncertainty and complementarity is precisely the grounds whereupon
Frayn can develop a theory of quantum ethics. After several rehearsals of the central event, the
characters and the audience are no closer to arriving at a consensus. Finally, Heisenberg suggests
that in the face of such uncertainty, “we should need a strange new quantum ethics” (Frayn 92).
This quantum ethics “seem[s] to express what we know and do not know about ourselves and
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each other, and the consequences of partial knowledge for moral life” (Velásquez 150). For
Frayn’s characters, possibility is preserved in “the peculiar benefits of knowledge they did not
have” (153). Eduardo Velásquez, a political philosopher, stresses the important way in which
such a model is both personal and shared:
The protagonists discover their own ignorance, appreciate each other’s, and thus
come face to face with collective uncertainty. A new way of looking at the
universe and each other dawns on them. As we shall see, the new vision does not
belong wholly to each protagonist, but neither is the viewpoint wholly another’s.
This new view of things is not strictly objective, a view somehow detached from
the viewer’s perspective, but neither is it strictly subjective, a view impenetrable
by the eye of another. We have the means by which to avoid radical objectivity
and radical subjectivity. Complementarity emerges alongside uncertainty. We can
now imagine the contours of a “quantum ethics.” (152-3)
History is necessary in providing an observable series of glimpses, but it only goes so far.
Through the type of responsible and meaningful engagement demonstrated in the quantum ethics
of Frayn’s Copenhagen and Sibbern’s scrapbook, the audience creates a new memory through
witnessing, thereby giving significance to the otherwise obscure traces of history.
The two disparate texts resonate because of the balance they strike between objectivity
and subjectivity. Those who view Sibbern’s scrapbook as an index of rare artifacts miss the
opportunity to engage with his memory and to create something alongside him. And the readers
and viewers of Frayn’s play who complain about his oversimplification of science or his
inaccurate depiction of Heisenberg and Bohr misinterpret the openness of his text as a nihilistic
dismissal of a history too vast or too uncertain to be of value. These misreadings are also those
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that would view a new and inclusive narrative of the Danish Resistance Museum as a denial of
history and a dishonor to the memory of those involved. But this is not so. To deny history would
be to foreclose on it, to suggest a definitive reading and an absolute conclusion. To dishonor the
memory of those who have gone before is to refuse to engage with it—holding the past at a
distance and ignoring the place each individual has in the continuous flow of time. To be party to
the event of witnessing requires those involved to take accountability for their agency in shaping
what it is that is being remembered. The aim of history and memory should be a flexible,
imaginative, quantum view of the past that engages with both the external and internal traces.
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